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Abstract
Being a complex subject of major importance in AI
Safety research, value alignment has been studied
from various perspectives in the last years. How-
ever, no final consensus on the design of ethical
utility functions facilitating AI value alignment has
been achieved yet. Given the urgency to identify
systematic solutions, we postulate that it might be
useful to start with the simple fact that for the util-
ity function of an AI not to violate human ethical
intuitions, it trivially has to be a model of these
intuitions and reflect their variety – whereby the
most accurate models pertaining to human entities
being biological organisms equipped with a brain
constructing concepts like moral judgements, are
scientific models. Thus, in order to better assess
the variety of human morality, we perform a trans-
disciplinary analysis applying a security mindset to
the issue and summarizing variety-relevant back-
ground knowledge from neuroscience and psychol-
ogy. We complement this information by linking
it to augmented utilitarianism as a suitable ethical
framework. Based on that, we propose first practi-
cal guidelines for the design of approximate ethical
goal functions that might better capture the variety
of human moral judgements. Finally, we conclude
and address future possible challenges.
1 Introduction
AI value alignment, the attempt to implement systems adher-
ing to human ethical values has been recognized as highly
relevant subtask in AI Safety at an international level and
studied by multiple AI and AI Safety researchers across di-
verse research subareas [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016; Soares
and Fallenstein, 2017; Yudkowsky, 2016] (a review is pro-
vided in [Taylor et al., 2016]). Moreover, the need to in-
vestigate value alignment has been included in the Asilomar
AI Principles [2018] with a worldwide support of researchers
from the field. While value alignment has often been tack-
led using reinforcement learning [Abel et al., 2016] (and also
reward modeling [Leike et al., 2018]) or inverse reinforce-
ment learning [Abbeel and Ng, 2004] methods, we focus on
the approach to explicitly formulate cardinal ethical utility
functions crafted by (a representation of) society and assisted
by science and technology which has been termed ethical
goal functions [Aliman and Kester, 2019b; Werkhoven et al.,
2018]. In order to be able to formulate utility functions that
do not violate the ethical intuitions of most entities in a so-
ciety, these ethical goal functions will have to be a model of
human ethical intuitions. This simple but important insight
can be derived from the good regulator theorem in cybernet-
ics [Conant and Ross Ashby, 1970] stating that “every good
regulator of a system must be a model of that system”. We
believe that instead of learning models of human intuitions in
their apparent complexity and ambiguity, AI Safety research
could also make use of the already available scientific knowl-
edge on the nature of human moral judgements and ethical
conceptions as made available e.g. by neuroscience and psy-
chology. The human brain did not evolve to facilitate rational
decision-making or the experience of emotions, but instead
to fulfill the core task of allostasis (anticipating the needs
of the body in an environment before they arise in order to
ensure growth, survival and reproduction) [Barrett, 2017a;
Kleckner et al., 2017]. Thereby, psychological functions
such as cognition, emotion or moral judgements are closely
linked to the predictive regulation of physiological needs of
the body [Kleckner et al., 2017] making it indispensable to
consider the embodied nature of morality when aspiring to
model it for AI value alignment.
For the purpose of facilitating the injection of requisite
knowledge reflecting the variety of human morality in ethical
goal functions, Section 2 provides information on the follow-
ing variety-relevant aspects: 1) the essential role of affect and
emotion in moral judgements from a modern construction-
ist neuroscience and cognitive science perspective followed
by 2) dyadic morality as a recent psychological theory on
the nature of cognitive templates for moral judgements. In
Section 3, we propose first guidelines on how to approxi-
mately formulate ethical goal functions using a recently pro-
posed non-normative socio-technological ethical framework
grounded in science called augmented utilitarianism [Aliman
and Kester, 2019a] that might be useful to better incorporate
the requisite variety of human ethical intuitions (especially in
comparison to classical utilitarianism). Thereafter, we pro-
pose how to possibly validate these functions within a socio-
technological feedback-loop [Aliman and Kester, 2019b]. Fi-
nally, in Section 4, we conclude and specify open challenges
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Figure 1: Intuitive illustration for the Law of Requisite Variety.
Taken from [Norman and Bar-Yam, 2018].
providing incentives for future work.
2 Variety in Embodied Morality
While value alignment is often seen as a safety problem, it
is possible to interpret and reformulate it as a related secu-
rity problem which might offer a helpful different perspective
on the subject emphasizing the need to capture the variety of
embodied morality. One possible way to look at AI value
alignment is to consider it as being an attempt to achieve ad-
vanced AI systems exhibiting adversarial robustness against
malicious adversaries attempting to lead the system to ac-
tion(s) or output(s) that are perceived as violating human eth-
ical intuitions. From an abstract point of view, one could dis-
tinguish different means by which an adversary might achieve
successful attacks: e.g. 1) by fooling the AI at the perception-
level (in analogy to classical adversarial examples [Goodfel-
low, 2018], this variant has been denoted ethical adversar-
ial examples [Aliman and Kester, 2019a]) which could lead
to an unethical behavior even if the utility function would
have been aligned with human ethical intuitions or 2) sim-
ply by disclosing dangerous (certainly unintended from the
designer) unethical implications encoded in its utility func-
tion by targeting specific mappings from perception to output
or action (this could be understood as ethical adversarial ex-
amples on the utility function itself). While the existence of
point 1) yields one more argument for the importance of re-
search on adversarial robustness at the perception-level for AI
Safety reasons [Goodfellow, 2019] and a sophisticated com-
bination of 1) and 2) might be thinkable, our exemplification
focuses on adversarial attacks of the type 2).
One could consider the explicitly formulated utility func-
tion U as representing a separate model1 that given a sample,
outputs a value determining the perceived ethical desirabil-
1a conceptually similar separation of objective function model
and optimizing agent has been recently performed for reward mod-
eling [Leike et al., 2018]
ity of that sample which should ideally be in line with the
society that crafted this utility function. The attacker which
has at his disposal the knowledge on human ethical intuitions,
can attempt targeted misclassifications at the level of a sin-
gle sample or at the level of an ordering of multiple samples
whereby the ground-truth are the ethical intuitions of most
people in a society. The Law of Requisite Variety from cy-
bernetics [Ashby, 1961] states that “only variety can destroy
variety”, with other words in order to cope with a certain va-
riety of problems or environmental variety, a system needs
to exhibit a suitable and sufficient variety of responses. Fig-
ure 1 offers an intuitive explanation of this law. Transferring
it to the mentioned utility function U , it is for instance con-
ceivable that if U does not encode affective information that
might lead to a difference in ethical evaluations, an attacker
can easily craft a sample whichU might misclassify as ethical
or unethical or causeU to generate a total ordering of samples
that might appear unethical from the perspective of most peo-
ple. Given that U does not have an influence on the variety of
human morality, the only way to respond to the disturbances
of the attacker and reduce the variety of possible undesirable
outcomes, is by increasing the own variety – which can be
achieved by encoding more relevant knowledge.
2.1 Role of Emotion and Affect in Morality
One fundamental and persistent misconception about human
biology (which does not only affect the understanding of the
nature of moral judgements) is the assumption that the brain
incorporates a layered architecture in which a battle between
emotion and cognition is given through the very anatomy of
the “triune brain” [MacLean, 1990] exhibiting three hierar-
chical layers: a reptilian brain on top of which an emotional
animalistic paleomammalian limbic system is located and a
final rational neomammalian cognition layer implemented in
the neocortex. This flawed view is not in accordance with
neuroscientific evidence and understanding [Barrett, 2017a;
Miller and Clark, 2018]. In fact, the assumed reactive and an-
imalistic limbic regions in the brain are predictive (e.g. they
send top-down predictions to more granular cortical regions),
control the body as well as attention mechanisms while being
the source of the brain’s internal model of the body [Barrett
and Simmons, 2015; Barrett, 2017b].
Emotion and cognition do not represent a dichotomy lead-
ing to a conflict in moral judgements [Helion and Pizarro,
2015]. Instead, the distinction between the experience of an
instance of a concept as belonging to the category of emotions
versus the category of cognition is grounded in the focus of
attention of the brain [Barrett et al., 2015] whereby “the expe-
rience of cognition occurs when the brain foregrounds men-
tal contents and processes” and “the experience of emotion
occurs when, in relation to the current situation, the brain
foregrounds bodily changes” [Hoemann and Barrett, 2019].
The mental phenomenon of actively dynamically simulating
different alternative scenarios (including anticipatory emo-
tions) has also been termed conceptual consumption [Gilbert
and Wilson, 2007] and plays a role in decision-making and
moral reasoning. While emotions are discrete constructions
of the human brain, core affect allows a low-dimensional
experience of interoceptive sensations (sensory array from
within the body) and is a continuous property of conciousness
with the dimensions of valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness)
and arousal (activation/deactivation) [Kleckner et al., 2017].
It has been argued that core affect provides a basis for
moral judgements in which different events are qualitatively
compared to each other [Cabanac, 2002]. Like other con-
structed mental states, moral judgements involve domain-
general brain processes which simply put combine 1) the in-
teroceptive sensory array, 2) the exteroceptive sensory inputs
from the environment and 3) past experience/ knowledge for
a goal-oriented situated conceptualization (as tool for allosta-
sis) [Oosterwijk et al., 2012]. From these key constituents
of mental constructions one can extract the following: con-
cepts (including morality) are perceiver-dependent and time-
dependent. Thereby, affect, (but not emotion [Cameron et
al., 2015]) is a necessary ingredient of every moral judge-
ment. More fundamentally, “the human brain is anatomi-
cally structured so that no decision or action can be free of
interoception and affect” [Barrett, 2017a] – this includes any
type of thoughts that seem to correspond to the folk terms
of “rational” and “cold”. Therefore, a utility function without
affect-related parameters might not exhibit a sufficient variety
and might lead to the violation of human ethical intuitions.
Morality cannot be separated from a model of the body,
since the brain constructs the human perception of reality
based on what seems of importance to the brain for the pur-
pose of allostasis which is inherently strongly linked to inte-
roception [Barrett, 2017a]. Interestingly, even the imagina-
tion of future not yet experienced events is facilitated through
situated recombinations of sensory-motor and affective na-
ture in a similar way as the simulation of actually experienced
events [Addis, 2018]. To sum up, there is no battle between
emotion and cognition in moral judgements. Moreover, there
is also no specific moral faculty in the brain, since moral
judgements are based on domain-general processes within
which affect is always involved to a certain degree. One could
obtain insufficient variety in dealing with an adversary craft-
ing ethical adversarial examples on a utility model U if one
ignores affective parameters. Further crucial parameters for
ethical utility functions could be e.g. of cultural, social and
socio-geographical nature.
2.2 Variety through “Dyadicness”
The psychological theory of dyadic morality [Schein and
Gray, 2018] posits that moral judgements are based on a fuzzy
cognitive template and related to the perception of an inten-
tional agent (iA) causing damage (d) to a vulnerable patient
(vP ) denoted iA d−→ vP . More precisely, the theory pos-
tulates that the perceived immorality of an act is related to
the following three elements: norm violations, negative af-
fect and importantly perceived harm. According to a study,
the reaction times in describing an act as immoral predict the
reaction times in categorizing the same act as harmful [Schein
and Gray, 2015]. The combination of these basic constituents
is suggested to lead to the emergence of a rich diversity of
moral judgements [Gray et al., 2017]. Dyadicness is under-
stood as a continuum predicting the condemnation of moral
acts. The more a human entity perceives an intentional agent
inflicting damage to a vulnerable patient, the more immoral
this human perceives the act. As stated by Schein and Gray,
the dyadic harm-based cognitive template “is rooted in innate
and evolved processes of the human mind; it is also shaped
by cultural learning, therefore allowing cultural pluralism”.
Importantly, the nature of this cognitive template reveals that
moral judgements besides being perceiver-dependent, might
vary across diverse parameters such as especially e.g. in re-
lation to the perception of agent, act and patient in the out-
come of the action. Further, the theory also foresees a pos-
sible time-dependency of moral judgements by introducing
the concept of a dyadic loop, a feedback cycle resulting in an
iterative polarization of moral judgements through social dis-
cussion modulating the perception of harm as time goes by.
Overall, moral judgements are understood as constructions
in the same way visual perception, cognition or emotion are
constructed by the human mind. Similarly to the existence
of variability in visual perception, variability in morality is
the norm which often leads to moral conflicts [Schein et al.,
2016]. However, the understanding that humans share the
same harm-based cognitive template for morality has been
described as reflecting “cognitive unity in the variety of per-
ceived harm” [Schein and Gray, 2018].
Analyzing the cognitive template of dyadic morality, one
can deduce that human moral judgements do not only con-
sider the outcome of an action as prioritized by consequen-
tialist frameworks like classical utilitarianism, nor do they
only consider the state of the agent which is in the focus
of virtue ethics. Furthermore, as opposed to deontological
ethics, the focus is not only on the nature of the performed ac-
tion. The main implications for the design of utility functions
that should ideally be aligned with human ethical values, is
that they might need to encode information on agent, action,
patient as well as on the perceivers – especially with regard
to the cultural background. This observation is fundamental
as it indicates that one might have to depart from classical
utilitarian utility functions U(s′) which are formulated as to-
tal orders at the abstraction level of outcomes i.e. states (of
affairs) s′. In line with this insight, is the context-sensitive
and perceiver-dependent type of utility functions considering
agent, action and outcome which has been recently proposed
within a novel ethical framework denoted augmented utilitar-
ianism [Aliman and Kester, 2019a] (abbreviated with AU in
the following). Reconsidering the dyadic morality template
iA
d−→ vP , it seems that in order to better capture the vari-
ety of human morality, utility functions – now transferring it
to the perspective of AI systems – would need to be at least
formulated at the abstraction level of a perceiver-dependent
evaluation of a transition s a−→ s′ leading from a state s to a
state s′ via an action a. We encode the required novel type
of utility function with Ux(s, a, s′) with x denoting a specific
perceiver. This formulation could enable an AI system im-
plemented as utility maximizer to jointly consider parameters
specified by a perceiver which are related to its perception of
agent, the action and the consequences of this action on a pa-
tient. Since the need to consider time-dependency has been
formulated, one would consequently also require to add the
time dimension to the arguments of the utility function lead-
ing to Ux((s, a, s′), t).
3 Approximating Ethical Goal Functions
While the psychological theory of dyadic morality was useful
to estimate the abstraction level at which one would at least
have to specify utility functions, the closer analysis on the
nature of the construction of mental states performed in Sec-
tion 2, abstractly provides a superset of primitive relevant pa-
rameters that might be critical elements of every moral judge-
ment (being a mental state). Given a perceiver x, the com-
ponents of this set are the following subsets: 1) parameters
encoding the interoceptive sensory array Bx (from within the
body) which are accessible to the human consciousness via
the low-dimensional core affect, 2) the exteroceptive sensory
array Ex encoding information from the environment and 3)
the prior experience Px encoding memories. Moreover, these
set of parameters obviously vary in time. However, to sim-
plify, it has been suggested within the mentioned AU frame-
work, that ethical goal functions will have to be updated reg-
ularly (leading to a so-called socio-technological feedback-
loop [Aliman and Kester, 2019b]) in the same way as votes
take place at regular intervals in a democracy. One could sim-
ilarly assume that this regular update will be sufficient to re-
flect a relevant change in moral opinion and perception.
3.1 Injecting Requisite Variety in Utility
For simplicity, we assume that the set of parameters Bx, Px
and Ex are invariant during the utility assignment process
in which a perceiver x has to specify the ethical desirabil-
ity of a transition s a−→ s′ by mapping it to a cardinal value
Ux(s, a, s
′) obtained by applying a not-nearer defined type of
scientifically determined transformation vx (chosen by x) on
the mental state of x. This results in the following naive and
simplified mapping however adequately reflecting the prop-
erty of mental-state-dependency formulated in the AU frame-
work (the required dependency of ethical utility functions on
parameters of the own mental state function mx in order to
avoid perverse instantiation scenarios [Aliman and Kester,
2019a]):
Ux(s, a, s
′) = vx(mx((s, a, s′), Bx, Px, Ex)) (1)
Conversely, the utility function of classical utilitarianism
is only defined at the impersonal and context-independent
abstraction level of U(s′) which has been argued to lead to
both perverse instantiation problem but also to the repugnant
conclusion and related impossibility theorems in population
ethics for consequentialist frameworks which do not apply to
mental-state-dependent utility functions [Aliman and Kester,
2019a]. The idea to restrict human ethical utility functions
to the considerations of outcomes of actions alone – ignor-
ing affective parameters of the own current self – as practiced
in classical utilitarianism while later referring to the result-
ing total orders with emotionally connoted adjectives such
as “repugnant” or “perverse” has been termed the perspecti-
val fallacy of utility assignment [Aliman and Kester, 2019b].
The use of consequentialist utility functions affected by the
impossibility theorems of Arrhenius [2000] has been justifi-
ably identified by Eckersley [2018] as a safety risk if used
in AI systems without more ado. It seems that the isolated
consideration of outcomes of actions (for consequentialism)
or actions (for deontological ethics) or the involved agents
(for virtue ethics) does not represent a good model of human
ethical intuitions. It is conceivable, that if a utility model U
is defined as utility function U(s′), the model cannot possi-
bly exhibit a sufficient variety and might more likely violate
human ethical intuitions than if it would be implemented as a
context-sensitive utility function Ux(s, a, s′). (Beyond that, it
has been argued that consequentialism implies the rejection of
“dispositions and emotions, such as regret, disappointment,
guilt and resentment” from “rational” deliberation [Verbeek,
2001] and should i.a. for this reason be disentangled from the
notion of rationality for which it cannot represent a plausible
requirement.)
It is noteworthy that in the context of reinforcement learn-
ing (e.g. in robotics) different types of reward functions are
usually formulated ranging from R(s′) to R(s, a, s′). For the
purpose of ethical utility functions for advanced AI systems
in critical application fields, we postulate that one does not
have the choice to specify the abstraction level of the utility
function, since for instance U(s′) might lead to safety risks.
Christiano et al. [2017] considered the elicitation of human
preferences on trajectory (state-action pairs) segments of a
reinforcement learning agent i.a. realized by human feedback
on short movies. For the purpose of utility elicitation in an
AU framework exemplarily using a naive model as specified
in equation (1), people will similarly have to assign utility to a
movie representing a transition in the future (either in a men-
tal mode or augmented by technology such as VR or AR [Al-
iman and Kester, 2019b]). However, it is obvious that this
naive utility assignment would not scale in practice. More-
over, it has not yet been specified how to aggregate ethical
goal functions at a societal level. In the following Subsec-
tion 3.2, we will address these issues by proposing a practica-
ble approximation of the utility function in (1) and a possible
societal aggregation of this approximate solution.
3.2 Approximation, Aggregation and Validation
So far, it has been stated throughout the paper that one has
to adequately increase the variety of a utility function meant
to be ethical in order to avoid violations of human ethical
intuitions and vulnerability to attackers crafting ethical ad-
versarial examples against the model. However, it is impor-
tant to note that despite the negatively formulated motivation
of the approach, the aim is to craft a utility model U which
represents a better model of human ethical intuitions in gen-
eral, thus ranging from samples that are perceived as highly
unethical to those that are assigned a high ethical desirabil-
ity. In order to craft practical solutions that lead to optimal
results, it might be advantageous to perform a thought ex-
periment imagining a utopia and from that impose practical
constraints on its viability. It might not seem realistic to de-
liberate a future utopia 1 as a sustainable society which is
stable across a very large time interval in which every human
being acts according to the ethical intuitions of all humans
including the own and every artificial intelligent system ful-
fills the ethical intuitions of all humans. However, it seems
more likely that within a utopia 2 being a stable society in
which every human achieves a high level of a scientific defi-
nition of well-being (such as e.g. PERMA [Seligman, 2012])
with artificial agents acting as to maximize context-sensitive
utility according to which (human or artificial) agents pro-
moting the (measurable) well-being of human patients is re-
garded as the most utile type of events, the ethical intuitions
of humans might tend to get closer to each other. The reason
being that the variety of human moral judgements might in-
terestingly decrease since it is conceivable that they will tend
to exhibit more similar prior experiences (all imprinted by
well-being) and have more similar environments (full of sta-
ble people with a high level of well-being). The main factor
drawing differences could be the body – especially biologi-
cal factors. However, the parameters related to interoception
might be closer to each other, since all humans exhibit a high
level of well-being which classically includes frequent pos-
itive affect. It is conceivable that with time, such a society
could converge towards the utopia 1.
In the following, we will denote the mentioned utopia-
related ideal cognitive template of a (human or artificial)
agent A performing an act w that contributes to the well-
being of a human patient P with A w−→ P in analogy to the
cognitive template of dyadic morality. (Thereby, A w−→ P
is perceiver-dependent i.a. because psychological measures
of well-being include subjective and self-reported elements
such as e.g. life satisfaction or furthermore positive emo-
tions [Seligman, 2012].) Augmented utilitarianism foresees
the need to at least depict a final goal at the abstraction level
of a perceiver-dependent function on a transition as reflected
in Ux(s, a, s′). The ideal cognitive template A
w−→ P formu-
lated for utopia 2 by which it has been argued that a decrease
in the variety of human morality might be achievable in the
long-term exhibits an abstraction level that is compatible with
Ux(s, a, s
′).
A thinkable strategy for the design of a utility model U that
is robust against ethical adversarial examples and a model
of human ethical intuitions is to try to adequately increase
its variety using relevant scientific knowledge and to com-
plementarily attempt to decrease the variety of human moral
judgements for instance by considering A w−→ P as high-level
final goal such that the described utopia 2 ideally becomes
a self-fulfilling prophecy. For it to be realizable in prac-
tice, we suggest that the appropriateness of a given aggre-
gated societal ethical goal function could be approximately
validated against its quantifiable impact on well-being for
society across the time dimension. Since it seems however
unfeasible to directly map all important transitions of a do-
main to their effect on the well-being of human entities, we
propose to consider perceiver-specific and domain-specific
utility functions indicating combined preferences that each
perceiver x considers to be relevant for well-being from the
viewpoint of x himself in that specific domain. For these
combined utility functions to be grounded in science, they
will have to be based on scientifically measurable parame-
ters. We postulate that a possible aggregation at a societal
level could be performed by the following steps: 1) agree-
ment on a common validation measure of an ethical goal
function (for instance the temporal development of societal
satisfaction with AI systems in a certain domain or with future
AGI systems, their aptitude to contribute to sustainable well-
being), 2) agreement on superset O of scientifically measur-
able and relevant parameters (encoding e.g. affective, dyadic,
cultural, social, political, socio-geographical but importantly
also law-relevant information) that are considered as impor-
tant across the whole society, 3) specification of personal util-
ity functions for each member n of a society of N members
allowing personalized and tailored combinations of a sub-
set of O, 4) aggregation to a societal ethical goal function
UTotal(s, a, s
′). Taken together, these considerations lead us
to the following possible approximation for an aggregated so-
cietal ethical goal function given a domain:
UTotal(s, a, s
′) =
N∑
n=1
j∑
i=1
wni f
n
fi(Ci) (2)
withN standing for the number of participating entities in so-
ciety, Ci = (pi1, pi2, ..., pim) being a cluster of m ≥ 1 corre-
lated parameters (whereby independent factors are assigned
an own cluster each) and f representing a set of preference
functions (form functions). For instance f = {f1, f2, ..., ff}
where f1 could be a linear transformation, f2 a concave, f3
a convex preference function and so on. Each entity n as-
signs a weight wni to a form function f
n
fi applied to a clus-
ter of parameters Ci whereby
∑j
i=1 w
n
i = 1. We define
O = {C1, C2, ...} as the superset of all parameters considered
in the overall aggregated utility function. Moreover, a ∈ A
with A representing the foreseen discrete action space at the
disposal of the AI. (It is important to note that while the AI
could directly perform actions in the environment, it could
also be used for policy-making and provide plans for human
agents.) Further, we consider a continuous state space with
the states s and s′ ∈ S = R|O|. Other aspects including
e.g. legal rules and norms on the action space can be imposed
as constraints on the utility function. In a nutshell, the util-
ity aggregation process can be understood as a voting process
in which each participating individual n distributes his vote
across scientifically measurable clusters of parameters Ci on
which he applies a preference function fnfi to which weights
wni are assigned as identified as relevant by n given a to be
approximated high-level societal goal (such as A w−→ P ). In
short, people do not have to agree on personal preferences
and weightings, but only on a superset of acceptable param-
eters, an aggregation method and an overall validation mea-
sure. (Note that instead of involving society as a whole for
each domain, the utility elicitation procedure can as well be
approximated by a transdisciplinary set of representative ex-
perts (e.g. from the legislative) crafting expert ethical goal
functions that attempt to ideally emulate UTotal(s, a, s′)).
Finally, it is important to note that the societal ethical goal
function specified in (2) will need to be updated (and evalu-
tated) at regular intervals due to the mental-state-dependency
of utility entailing time-dependency [Aliman and Kester,
2019a]. This leads to the necessity of a socio-technological
feedback-loop which might concurrently offer the possibil-
ity of a dynamical ethical enhancement [Aliman and Kester,
2019b; Werkhoven et al., 2018]. Pre-deployment, one could
in the future attempt a validation via selected preemptive sim-
ulations [Aliman and Kester, 2019b] in which (a represen-
tation of) society experiences simulations of future events
(s, a, s′) as movies, immersive audio-stories or later in VR
and AR environments. During these experiences, one could
approximately measure the temporal profile of the so-called
artificially simulated future instant utility [Aliman and Kester,
2019b] denoted UTotalAS being a potential constituent of fu-
ture well-being. Thereby, UTotalAS refers to the instant util-
ity [Kahneman et al., 1997] experienced during a technology-
aided simulation of a future event whereby instant utility
refers to the affective dimension of valence at a certain time
t. The temporal integral that a measure of UTotalAS could
approximate is specified as:
UTotalAS(s, a, s
′) ≈
N∑
n=1
∫ T
t0
In(t)dt (3)
with t0referring to the starting point of experiencing the simu-
lation of the event (s, a, s′) augmented by technology (movie,
audio-story, AR, VR) and T the end of this experience. In(t)
represents the valence dimension of core affect experienced
by n at time t. Finally, post-deployment, the ethical goal
function of an AI system can be validated using the valida-
tion measure agreed upon before utility aggregation (such as
the temporal development of societal-level satisfaction with
an AI system, well-being or even the perception of dyadic-
ness) that has to be a priori determined.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we motivated the need in AI value alignment
to attempt to model utility functions capturing the variety of
human moral judgements through the integration of relevant
scientific knowledge – especially from neuroscience and psy-
chology – (instead of learning) in order to avoid violations of
human ethical intuitions. We reformulated value alignment as
a security task and introduced the requirement to increase the
variety within classical utility functions positing that a util-
ity function which does not integrate affective and perceiver-
dependent dyadic information does not exhibit sufficient va-
riety and might not exhibit robustness against correspond-
ing adversaries. Using augmented utilitarianism as a suitable
non-normative ethical framework, we proposed a methodol-
ogy to implement and possibly validate societal perceiver-
dependent ethical goal functions with the goal to better in-
corporate the requisite variety for AI value alignment.
In future work, one could extend and refine the discussed
methodology, study a more systematic validation approach
for ethical goal functions and perform first experimental stud-
ies. Moreover, the “security of the utility function itself is es-
sential, due to the possibility of its modification by malevolent
actors during the deployment phase” [Aliman and Kester,
2019a]. For this purpose, a blockchain-based solution might
be advantageous. In addition, it is important to note that
even with utility functions exhibiting a sufficient variety for
AI value alignment, it might still be possible for a malicious
attacker to craft adversarial examples against a utility max-
imizer at the perception-level which might lead to unethi-
cal behavior. Besides that, one might first need to perform
policy-by-simulation [Werkhoven et al., 2018] prior to the de-
ployment of advanced AI systems equipped with ethical goal
functions for safety reasons. Last but not least, the usage of
ethical goal functions might represent an interesting approach
to the AI coordination subtask in AI Safety, since an interna-
tional use of this method might contribute to reduce the AI
race to the problem-solving ability dimension [Aliman and
Kester, 2019b].
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